Recent studies find that democratization increases economic growth but often do not address through what channels such an effect could travel. This study considers whether or not democratization strengthens the rule of law, an institutional measure purported to increase economic growth. Utilizing a panel dataset from 1984 to 2007 for 127 countries and both fixed effect and dynamic GMM methodologies, we examine whether democratization promotes the rule of law. We generally find a positive influence from democratization upon the rule of law although effects are strongest for sub-Saharan Africa.
I. Introduction
Many studies point to the importance of institutions for economic growth. 1 Acemoglu et al. (2005) and Acemoglu (2010) provide surveys of this literature. North (1990) defines institutions as "the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction". He asserts that institutions that secure property rights promote economic development. One specific component of institutions that has received attention is adherence to the rule of law. By "rule of law" we mean a judicial regime in which no one is above the law and everyone is equal before the law (Dicey, 1885) . People abide by judicial decisions and people's day-to-day actions are generally lawful in that they do not conflict with legal codes. One reason to focus on the rule of law is its importance in protecting property and promoting productive activities. Rodrik et al. (2004) state that in principle the rule of law captures more elements describing institutional quality than do other measures.
Given this presumed importance, a question then arises as to why the rule of law is more prevalent in some countries than in others. Some have examined the effects of long-run historical factors such as the degree of European influence or geographic factors. These factors then determine the type of institutions which then affect long-run income levels. See Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2001) as examples. We take a different approach, examining a more contemporaneous factor. Specifically, we consider whether democracy promotes the rule of law and so whether democratization could then improve the rule of law. Recent studies show that democratization raises economic growth 1 . Our study explores whether promoting the rule of law could be a channel that explains these findings. Barro (1996) considered a similar issue. He found that although greater maintenance of the rule of law is favorable to economic growth, he found little evidence that democracy promotes the rule of law. Our study differs from Barro`s in several dimensions. First, Barro utilizes cross-sectional variation to identify long-run patterns. A possible problem of this specification could arise from omitted variable bias and reverse causality (Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005) . We will take steps below to lessen these concerns. Second, a cross-country sample does not utilize the within country variation in the degree of democracy or adherence to the rule of law. A panel can exploit such variation. This could be especially important given Barro's application. His democracy variable comes from 1975 whereas his rule of law variable is from 1980. Therefore, he does not incorporate the post-1980 events into his analysis, including the large number of countries that democratized when the Soviet Union fell. Our study considers a panel dataset, spanning 1984 to 2007, and so considers these changes. Use of a panel also allows us to examine timing issues which were not feasible given Barro's approach. We consider short and long-run effects of democratization upon the rule of law. Perhaps democratization initially supports the rule of law but then the effects of democratization turn negative as rent-seeking becomes more frequent. Or, perhaps effects become stronger as democracies strengthen and uncertainty diminishes. As a final distinction from Barro`s work, we examine whether the effects of democratization upon the rule of 1 See Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) , Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) , Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) for examples and surveys of this literature. law differ across regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa. Any differences could be a sign that cultures and histories that differentiate global regions play a significant role in determining the association between democracy and the rule of law.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an overview of the different studies on political and economic institutions. Section 3 provides a detailed description of our data. The methodology is outlined in section 4.
The results are presented in section 5. Finally, section 6 summarizes the core findings of this study and provides suggestions for future work.
II. Literature Review
One research path has been to examine the role of economic institutions in economic growth and development. Acemoglu et al. (2001) , Hall and Jones (1999) , Engermann and Sokoloff (1997) , Dollar and Kraay (2000) , and many others show that institutions enhance economic growth.
On the other hand, there has been a long debate on whether political institutions, namely a democratic versus an authoritarian regime, influence economic growth. Earlier studies do not show unambiguous associations between democracy and growth as findings are mixed. 1 Rodrik (1997) did not find any significant impact of democratization on growth. Similarly, Przeworski et al. (2000) did not find any differences on long-run growth across political regimes. On the other hand, more recent studies such as Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) , Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) and Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) employ panel data techniques exploiting the within country variation 1 See Przeworski and Limongi (1993) for a survey of this earlier literature. while controlling for time invariant cross-country heterogeneity. These studies show a positive impact of democratization upon economic growth.
However, such findings then beg the question as to why democratizations could increase economic growth. Might a beneficial impact of democratization upon the rule of law be one such channel? If democratization leads to more political instability as governing structures are re-organized then the rule of law could weaken, at least in the short run. On the other hand, if officials in democracies are more greatly restrained and must more greatly adhere to specified codes, then democratic reforms could strengthen the rule of law, especially if officials in authoritarian regimes are allowed a greater degree of capriciousness in administering their duties.
Theoretical models have also considered these issues. Rivera-Batiz (2002) shows that stronger democratic institutions influence governance by constraining the actions of corrupt bureaucrats. Since officials are less able to take such illegal actions, one can view this outcome as a strengthening of the rule of law. On the other hand, Acemoglu and Johnson (2006) create a model where property rights do not improve following democratization as the previous elite spend resources to retain the de facto status quo.
They provide the example of the American South following the Civil War and the failure of Reconstruction. Suffrage was nominally extended to blacks, but they enjoyed few legal protections and their property rights were insecure. White violence against them was tolerated even when not generally encouraged and so property rights remained similar to what they were before the Civil War. That is, the expansion of suffrage did not expand property rights or better promote the rule of law, at least for the former slaves. Hoff and Stiglitz (2004) consider another case where democratization might not promote the rule of law. They create a model where agents choose whether or not to promote the rule of law. The rule of law fails to materialize when a sufficient mass of agents oppose it. They use their model to show why the rapid privatization that occurred in the countries arising out of the demise of the Soviet Union failed to establish strong property rights. With many agents having few initial resources or resources that could easily be hidden outside the country, many agents then had less incentive to promote strong property rights but instead wanted a system where it was easier to strip property away from others. In this setting, failure to promote a rule of law in a democracy becomes individually optimal even if it is detrimental for society. Olson et al. (1996) claim that an autocrat with a long time horizon has incentives to protect property rights because this increases national income which in turn increases tax revenue. Although long-lasting democracies, they claim, better secure property rights than do autocracies or new democracies, quickly instituting a longstanding democracy is not feasible for an existing autocratic country. Zakaria (2004) is also wary that property rights will improve under new democracies. Such fledgling democracies can create political instability and greater uncertainty. Democratic leaders of such regimes might not have the political standing to institute salutary institutional reforms. He argues that the best way to improve institutions that promote long run growth is under a benevolent dictator as opposed to a potentially chaotic democracy. Under this view, democratizations could then even worsen property rights, at least in the short run.
Other studies argue that the presence of other reforms or initial conditions impacts associations between democracy and institutions and so whether or not democracy promotes property rights such as the rule of law could be contingent on other factors. Tavares (2007) shows that democratization followed by rapid trade liberalization decreases the level of corruption. According to Musila (2007) , authoritarian countries are less prone to corruption than countries at intermediate levels of democracy, but beyond the threshold level of democracy, more democratic countries are less prone to corruption. 1 On the other hand, Sunde et al. (2008) examine the role of interactions between political environment and inequality for the rule of law. Their results suggest that democracy is associated with greater adherence to the rule of law when inequality is lower.
Our study complements these studies by exploring the impact that political regimes have on the rule of law. As stated above, studies such as Tavares (2007) and Musila (2007) have considered how democratic reform could affect the prevalence of corruption. We focus on the rule of law for two reasons. One, Rodrik et al. (2004) state that in principle the rule of law captures more elements determining institutional quality than do other measures. Two, although different institutional measures tend to be correlated with one another, they need not move in lock step as meaningful differences can still arise. Figure 1 presents examples where movements in the rule of law and corruption (another widely studied measure of institutional quality) greatly differ. 2 Therefore, we do not presume that findings measuring associations between democracy and corruption necessarily apply to the rule of law.
III. Data
We analyze annual data from 127 countries during the period 1984-2007. Data for the rule of law only begins in 1984. We use annual data to most precisely pinpoint changes in political regime. We could have also averaged data over decades in order to "remove" business cycle effects. However, by averaging, we would have then removed some of the within-country variation in the sample. 1 Attanasio et al. (2000) explain why one could prefer estimating annual data rather than first averaging the data.
The democracy and rule of law variables are described below. We will also follow the World Bank classification when constructing regional dummies. 2 The appendix provides definitions and sources of the data. Table 1 lists all the countries included in our sample and categorizes their political regime according to Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) .
The rule of law [RULE] variable comes from the International Country Risk
Guide 3,1 from Political Risk Services. This index reflects the degree to which the citizens 1 As a robustness check, robustness check, however, we will average over three-year windows.
2 These are East Asia and Pacific (EAP), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia (SE), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and Western Europe (WE). 3 As an alternative measure for rule of law, we use the World Bank indicator (World Governance Indicators -WGI, rule of law) even though it only begins from 1996 (see Kaufmann et al., 1999) . This variable ranges from -2.5 to +2.5 where higher numbers denote better institutional quality. of a country are willing to accept established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes (Sunde et al., 2008) . The ratings range from 0 to 6, where higher scores indicate "sound political institutions, a strong court system, and provisions for an orderly succession of power" (see Knack and Keefer, 1995) . According to the ICRG, the rule of law (law and order) is constructed as follows:
"Law and Order are assessed separately, with each subcomponent comprising zero to three points. The Law subcomponent is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law. Thus, a country can enjoy a high rating -3in terms of its judicial system, but a low rating -1if it suffers from a very high crime rate or if the law is routinely ignored without effective sanction (for example, widespread illegal strikes)."
Democracy [DEM] is measured using the dataset compiled by Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) . They do not proffer any specific definition of democracy but they do list four criteria that a democracy must have: free, competitive, and fair elections; elections involving actual transfers of power (as opposed to the military, for example, setting aside the results of an election); broad suffrage in that no sizable part of the 1 While the ICRG and WGI variables have been widely used in the literature, Glaeser et al. (2004) consider these variables as inappropriate to measure institutions such as adherence to the rule of law. They claim that these variables are outcome measures and do not measure institutions North (1990) defines as constraints on human interactions. More to the point, they claim that these measures do not code dictators, who choose to respect property rights, any differently than democratically elected leaders who have no choice but to respect them. However, we consider these variables as suitable proxies for institutions because they still provide constraints within society. For example, an impartial judicial system whose rulings are enforced still provides constraints for the majority of the populace regardless of whether it was established under an autocracy or a democracy. population is excluded as in South Africa during apartheid; and political stability. Using a variety of sources, PS then ascertain when a democratization episode occurred. They further divide democracies into "full" and "partial" ones. A full democracy occurs when Freedom House designates the country as fully free AND when the country has a Polity IV score above seven (on a -10 to +10 scale) on its composite democracy index. 1 See Marshall and Jaggers (2004) for a description of the Polity IV political data. 2 Like PS, DEM it equals one for country i at time t if country i fully or partially democratized during or before time t. We will later examine full and partial democracies individually. Finally, the democracy must be sustained to be classified as such according to PS. Zimbabwe, for example, is not considered to be a democracy pre-1987 because it suffered a reversal during that year. 3 We use the PS classification for several reasons. First, it can be used in a panel since DEM varies over time. Second, the incorporation of both the Freedom House and the Polity IV measures creates a stricter standard of democracy thereby diminishing the presence of ambiguous cases. On the other hand, this classification is still built upon these commonly used measures in the growth literature. Not only are they familiar within this literature but their widespread use makes comparisons with other studies more straightforward. Of course, a disadvantage of using dummy variables relative to a measure that can take on several values is that dummy variables are more coarse measures of political change. However, a benefit is that political classifications of countries are often given as "either/or" and so dummy variables get to the heart of this dichotomy. It is also not clear how one should interpret indices such as the Freedom House indices. Does the 1-7 Freedom House categorization of political rights merely represent ordinal groupings? Or, can its increments be taken literally in that, for example, the move from 3 to 2 represents the same degree of movement towards democracy as a move from 4 to 3? If the Freedom House categorization is merely ordinal, then the direct use of these indices to measure change becomes more problematic.
Therefore, due to these concerns we focus on the PS classification but will later consider other measures as robustness checks such as the Freedom House average of the civil liberties and political rights sub-indices, denoted as FH, and the Polity IV measure, denoted as POLITY. Use of these additional variables can also account for temporary democratic episodes that the PS measures miss (since a country must remain democratic to be classified as a democracy). Table 2 contains descriptive statistics and correlations across the key variables.
Another control variable included in many specifications is the natural log of real GDP per capita [GDP], taken from the Penn World Tables, version 6.3. This variable is used as a proxy for the level of economic development. Other control variables included as robustness checks will be discussed below.
Before proceeding with the formal methodology, a cursory look at the data shows that only two cases arise where the rule of law index falls by over one unit in the first few years after democratization. RULE goes from 3 in 1998 (the year prior to becoming a democracy) in Nigeria to 1.5 in 2002. For Mexico, RULE goes from 3 in 1996 to 2 in 1999. In all other cases, RULE either increases or remains stable. Therefore, democratization does not appear to generally weaken the rule of law although to what extent it strengthens the rule of law remains less clear and will be examined below.
IV. Methodology
We examine the within-country associations between democratization and the rule of law and so consider a cross-country panel of annual data. We exploit a difference-indifference specification in which reforming countries are the "treated" group. Countries that did not go through this reform are the "control" group. 1 Our specification is:
where i (i=1,…,N) and t (t=1,…,T) subscripts denote country and year, respectively. The intercepts β 0i and β 1t indicate country and year fixed effects in order to capture the timeinvariant country-specific heterogeneity and the unobservable country-invariant time effects. RULE is the rule of law and DEM denotes democratization. Matrix X will initially be empty but we later control for other explanatory variables. The residual has 1 Giavazzi and Tabellinig (2005) and Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) also use similar econometric methodologies to identify the effects of political reforms on economic performance outcomes. zero mean but not necessarily identical variance across countries. We also allow for arbitrary correlation over time and so calculate standard errors as in Arellano (1987) 1 . Of note in (1) is that the right hand side contains the lagged dependent variable.
We include the lag for two reasons. First, there is likely to be persistence in the rule of law even after controlling for time-invariant factors. Second, RULE is bounded between zero and six, making it impossible for countries at zero to move downward or for countries at six to move upwards. Therefore, future movements in RULE depend on its current value and so we control for RULE it-1 when examining RULE it . Unfortunately, the presence of a lagged dependent variable increases the potential for biased coefficient estimates. 2 Therefore, we also employ a dynamic GMM estimation model, the Arellano and Bond (1991) first-difference GMM estimator, to test the robustness of our findings where lagged RULE and DEM are considered endogenous variables. Additionally, we compute robust standard errors that allow for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within countries.
A dynamic generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation offers advantages to OLS (Edison et al., 2000) . First, by differencing the model, it eliminates any biases generated from country-specific and time-invariant factors (which is also advantage of the "fixed effects" specification found in (1)). Second, using lagged values of the endogenous explanatory variables, it addresses the potential endogeneity of these variables. In our model we use the second lags of these variables in levels to serve as instruments for the first differences. 1 Third, it controls for any biases generated by including a lagged dependent variable on the right hand side. The consistency of the dynamic generalized method of moments depends on two critical assumptions: a) the validity of the instruments and b) the error term is not serially correlated. In order to test the above assumptions we perform the Sargan and the serial correlation tests, respectively. The Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions is under the null hypothesis that instruments are valid and suitable, while the serial correlation test is under the null that the error term is not serially correlated. Where relevant, we present the p-values from these tests in our tables. We fail to reject the null in all of them.
Equation (1) represents our baseline specification. However, to address other issues we also consider the following extensions.
Full versus Partial Democratizations
Our democratization variable DEM does not distinguish full democracies from partial ones. However, do further democratic reforms improve the rule of law relative to initial steps toward democracy? Barro (1996) shows that partial democracies have higher growth rates than do full democracies. To address this issue, we construct two new (dummy) variables. DEM_P equals one for partial democracies only and DEM_F equals one for full democracies only. Of course, DEM_P + DEM_F = DEM for all observations. The baseline specification becomes: (2) If β 4 and β 5 differ, then the association between democracy and RULE depends upon the degree of democracy.
Regional Differences
It is also possible that the effects of democratization upon the rule of law differ across regions. Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) find that democratization is more beneficial upon growth in sub-Saharan Africa. Sylwester (2009) suggests that the effects of democracy on growth are more positive in newer countries. Englebert (2000) argues that many sub-Saharan African countries lack pre-colonial antecedents. Without traditional power structures to serve as a political foundation, leaders must curry favor with various groups to stay in power. In some cases, this could involve weakening (or eliminating) property rights for some groups so as to benefit others. A recent example is Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, confiscating land from white farmers to give to his supporters.
Such policies politically benefit the leader in the short run at the expense of long-run growth. Davidson (1982) provides a similar diagnosis as to why Africa has not grown as quickly as other regions but also argues that democratization could provide a partial solution as popular legitimacy could give leaders sufficient political power so that they do not need to engage in such rent seeking activities. Perhaps leaders could then be better able to enact institutional reforms that could further benefit the economy. 1 If so, then the effects of democratization upon the rule of law could be stronger for sub-Saharan African than for other regions. Effects upon the rule of law could also differ for Eastern European countries as their transitions occurred alongside economic reforms coinciding with the fall of the Soviet Union. Table 3 presents the change in the rule of law score for democratized countries in each region of the world between 1984 and 2007. It also reports the average rule of law score for the 5 years before and after democratization (or for fewer years for the countries where data is not available). For some countries the rule of law score went up and for others down. However, it appears that the effects of democratization have greater improvements on the rule of law score for the Sub-Saharan African countries. To formally account for such differences, we include interactive terms in (1) that include DEM and the respective regional dummies. These regions are: East Asia and Pacific (EAP), Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), South Asia (SA), and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 2
Short run versus long run effects.
It is also possible that the effects of democratization upon the rule of law are not instantaneous but appear gradually over time. Thus, we construct two dummy variables based on the variable DEM: DEM_SHORT and DEM_LONG. If a democratization event occurs in country i at time t, then DEM_SHORT is = 1 for t ≤ s ≤ t+5 and = 0 otherwise. DEM_LONG is = 1 for s > t+5 and = 0 otherwise. DEM_SHORT is presumed to capture transitional effects from democratization upon the rule of law whereas DEM_LONG is presumed to capture longer run effects.
V. Results
Table 4 presents results from our initial specifications. Column 1 provides the simplest specification and contains the full sample. The coefficient upon RULE is 0.10, statistically significant at the 5% level. Column 2 changes the control group by omitting all the countries that were democratic throughout the sample period from 1984 to 2007.
The effect of democratization upon the rule of law is now compared to only those countries that remained nondemocratic (as opposed to those that remained nondemocratic or were democratic throughout the sample period in column 1). Nevertheless, the coefficient upon RULE barely changes. Column 3 shows that the results in column 1 are also robust to the removal of the formerly socialist countries. Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) remove these countries due to the very special circumstance, namely the fall of the Soviet Union, accompanying democratization. As before, the coefficient upon RULE To put the coefficient estimates into context, consider a country that democratizes. A coefficient estimate of 0.10 predicts that RULE increases by 0.10 points.
This change is not large since RULE ranges from zero to six with a standard deviation of 1.5. However, this standard deviation partly stems from cross-country variation. Taking the standard deviation of RULE for each country and then averaging across countries produces a value of 0.7. That is, 0.7 is the average standard deviation of RULE for each country. Therefore, a change in RULE of 0.10 represents a change of roughly 15% of the average within country standard deviation. This magnitude suggests that democratization can positively affect the rule of law but that one should not expect "miraculous" improvements in the rule of law either. Democratization helps but is not a panacea.
As explained above, we use annual data to best pinpoint democratization events.
But problems could also arise with annual data. Short run fluctuations could weaken associations or could be mistaken for more permanent effects of democratization. The specifications in table 5 repeat those of table 4 but we consider three-year averages. 2 Instead of 24 annual periods, we now have eight 3-year windows. Such a specification could also mitigate problems of serial correlation that are more prevalent when using annual data. Nevertheless, the coefficients upon DEM remain positive and statistically significant.
As described above, a potential problem is the presence of right hand side endogenous variables. Therefore, we utilize dynamic GMM estimation as discussed earlier. Table 6 presents the results of this methodology, both using annual data and the 3-year windows. The regressors include the lagged rule of law, the democracy dummy, and GDP. To avoid problems of "too many instruments" (see Roodman, 2009 ), we instrument only using the two-period lags of the endogenous variables. The coefficient estimates upon DEM are approximate in magnitude to those of the fixed effects estimation when using annual data but increase in magnitude when considering the 3-year windows.
We further check the robustness of our results in Table 7 by Unsuccessful democratizations in which the democracy did not survive are not considered. If these unsuccessful democratizations have a less positive (or even negative) impact upon the rule of law then that would diminish the positive association between the two found above. However, the coefficients upon FH and POLITY remain positive and significant, both in columns 1 and 2 and in columns 4 and 5 that remove the countries that were always democratic throughout the sample period. The estimates in Table 6 confirm the findings of our earlier analysis. More specifically, in columns 1 and 4 where the FH index is employed to measure democracy, the results show a positive relationship between democracy and the rule of law. Columns 2 and 5 of Table 7 use the Polity measure of democracy. The estimated coefficient on POLITY remains positive and significant.
Therefore, we generally find a positive association between democracy and the rule of law. Countries that became democratic during the sample period experienced improvements in the rule of law relative both to countries that never underwent a change in status (that is, remained democratic or nondemocratic) and to only those countries that remained nondemocratic (as in Table 5 ). These results are robust to excluding former socialist countries and so findings are not solely driven by the fall of the Soviet Union.
However, to what extent are these findings applicable to specific regions and how fast does the rule of law improve following democratization? Do partial democracies affect the rule of law differently than do full democracies? We now consider these issues. Table 7 present results under the specification in equation (2).
Columns 3 and 6 of
We replace DEM with two variables, DEM_P (partial democracies) and DEM_F (full democracies). In column 3, the coefficient estimate on DEM_F is positive and significant at the 5% level. On the other hand, the parameter estimate for DEM_P is positive but only significant at the 10% level. However, the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates of both variables are similar. Therefore, we find some evidence that the rule of law improves when countries first become democratic even if democratic reforms are not complete. Evidence is statistically stronger that countries becoming fully democratic improve the rule of law. Nevertheless, no evidence arises that the effect upon the rule of law differs between the set of countries becoming partially democratic and those becoming fully democratic. That is, the benefit of democratic reforms appears to come with initial reforms, regardless of whether the democracy becomes stronger. These results hold for both the full sample and the sample removing always democratic countries.
These results with partial and full democracies also better explain a finding from Assiotis and Sylwester (2010) . They do not find a strong association between (their analogs of) DEM_F and RULE. However, the focus of that study was upon full democratization and so their control group consisted of three groups of countries:
countries that remained nondemocratic, countries that were fully democratic throughout the sample period, and countries that became only partially democratic. The similarity of coefficient estimates between DEM_F and DEM_P provides a possible explanation for their results. With little difference between the two groups of democracies, relegating partial democracies to the control group would then lessen differences between full democracies and the control group.
To explore whether the effects of democratization upon the rule of law are parallel across regions we interact DEM with regional dummies. Columns 1 through 5 of Table 8 present various specifications allowing for such interactions. Alternatively, in column 6 we run our baseline specification only for sub-Saharan African countries. We find that democratization in East Asia and Pacific, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa promotes the rule of law more than it does in other regions. This finding, at least for sub-Saharan Africa, possibly stems from the fact that institutions in these countries were relatively weaker prior to democratization and so perhaps political reforms sparked reforms along other dimensions as well. Our results can directly speak to findings from past studies suggesting that the benefits of democratization are higher in African countries compared to the rest of the world as in Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) and Sylwester (2009) . Our results suggest that these findings for sub-Saharan Africa can be explained by the greater improvement in the rule of law within this region following democratization. Of course, such an explanation probably does not hold for East Asian countries. Results for South Asia are entirely driven by Bangladesh and so we place less emphasis upon this region.
The above analysis generally finds evidence that democratization promotes the rule of law. However, a weakness of this specification is that the effects of democratization on the rule of law are constrained to be instantaneous. However, democratization could initially have negative effects due to transitional costs. Effects could then become stronger as democracies solidify. Of course, other possibilities exist as well. To address these issues, we replace DEM with DEM_SHORT and DEM_LONG. Table 9 provides the results. As expected, coefficients estimates across these dummies differ.
In column 1, the coefficient upon DEM_SHORT is two to three times as great as that upon DEM_LONG. Democratization appears to have greater effects upon the rule of law in the short run. One possibility is that the rule of law truly improves following democratization but then deteriorates for some reason as the democracy solidifies.
Another possibility, however, is that the increase in the rule of law is not "real" but stems from a presumption of the analysts creating the RULE index that the rule of law should be higher when a country becomes democratic. Perhaps such analysts give the benefit of the doubt in such cases when information is limited as to the changes that democratization creates. In the following years, if more information becomes available that changes to the rule of law are small or nonexistent, then their re-assessments better reflect this fact. This finding somewhat contrasts findings from other research. More specifically, Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) provide empirical evidence suggesting that the merits of democratization on growth come in the long-run. To the extent that improvements in the rule of law raise growth then we would expect to see a greater short run impact. Our finding is also somewhat attenuated in column 3 where we remove the countries that were always democratic. Coefficient estimates upon DEM_SHORT and DEM_LONG are less distinct.
However, we also find a possible caveat. Democratization does appear to have larger effects upon the rule of law in the long run in SSA countries as shown in columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 9 . Although coefficients on DEM_SHORT*SSA are not statistically significant, they are positive and similar in magnitude to their long run counterparts. No evidence arises that the rule of law deteriorated in SSA country shortly after democratization. For comparison purposes in panel B of Table 9 , we present the coefficients on the democracy variables when replacing SSA in column 2 with dummies for other regions. For these other regions, less evidence arises that democratization increased in the rule of law in the long run. In fact, long run estimates are even negative for LAC countries. As before, these findings can further help explain why democratization appears to be more beneficial for long run growth for SSA countries than for other regions as reported in Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) and Sylwester (2009) .
VI. Conclusions
This paper investigates the association between democratization and rule of law.
We generally find that the rule of law increases as countries become democratic although results are strongest for sub-Saharan Africa. Utilizing various panel data techniques we find that democratization does, indeed, positively influence the rule of law. Additionally, our results reveal that the timing of the effects of democratization upon the rule of law also matters. With our global sample, we find more evidence that democratization only increases the rule of law in the short run. However, stronger long-run effects are found for sub-Saharan African countries. These results can help us better understand why democratization could raise economic growth as found in the recent literature.
Nevertheless, investigating other channels through which democracy could affect growth is warranted. From a policy perspective, sub-Saharan Africa could be a focus of the international community in promoting democratic reforms, since the payoffs to such reforms could be relatively larger in this region than in others. Of course, the devil is in the details. Future work will consider what aspects of democratic reforms are most conducive to improvements in economic institutions such as the rule of law. White period standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All Columns include year fixed effects, country fixed effects, and regional trends to account for dynamic heterogeneity across regions. White period standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All Columns include year fixed effects, country fixed effects, and regional trends to account for dynamic heterogeneity across regions. The specifications employ eight 3-year averages beginning with 1984-6 and ending with 2005-7. White period standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All Columns include year fixed effects, country fixed effects, and regional trends to account for dynamic heterogeneity across regions. White period standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All Columns include year fixed effects, country fixed effects, and regional trends to account for dynamic heterogeneity across regions. a Column 6 only includes sub-Saharan African countries. SSA denotes sub-Saharan Africa. SA denotes South Asia. EAP denotes East Asia and Pacific and LAC denotes Latin America and Caribbean. (0.008) *** (0.008) *** (0.01) *** (0.009) *** (0.008) *** (0.008) *** 
